Introduction
The international community's divide over recognizing Kosovo has made its admission to international organizations particularly challenging. It appears that Kosovo has been able to attain membership only in those organizations where unanimity was unnecessary and no veto rights could be exercised.2 Kosovo has generally applied for membership in international organizations after having secured the necessary votes from both recognizing and some nonrecognizing states.3 Having already joined the International Monetary Fund,4 the World Bank,5 and certain other international bodies, Kosovo has expressed its wish to accede to the Council of Europe (CoE). The fact that Kosovo has been recognized by more than two-thirds of CoE member states is an indicator that, in principle, Kosovo could ensure the votes necessary for its admission. In 2012, Kosovo established a diplomatic office in Strasbourg. Two years later, it became a member of the CoE Development Bank and the Venice Commission,7 creating new momentum on the country's path to CoE membership. At the same time, this path is expected to be a bumpy one as long as Serbia, a member of the CoE, considers Kosovo part of its territory.
Against this background, this article discusses Kosovo's quest for CoE membership in the following order. First, it analyses the CoE membership criteria and their application in practice, including in the context of disputed territories. Second, it scrutinizes Kosovo's ability to fulfill these membership criteria. Third, it analyses the CoE's admission procedure and highlights some political aspects in this regard that should not be overlooked. Finally, the concluding remarks discuss the prospects for Kosovo's admission to the CoE.
CoE Membership Criteria and Their Application in Practice
The CoE's membership criteria are specified in Articles 3 and 4 of its Statute.8 According to Article 3, the CoE may grant membership to a state that accepts "the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and [that collaborates] sincerely and effectively in the realization of the aim of the Council as specified in Chapter i". It follows from Article 3 that compliance with the rule of law and human rights standards is essential. The broad language of Article 3 allows pace, a CoE institution empowered to assess the membership criteria and to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which standards in the areas of human rights and rule of law a state has to fulfill to join the organization. Article 3 also allows pace to establish new conditions. After the fall of the Ber- Pursuant to Article 4, membership in the CoE is limited to European states that are able and willing to comply with the membership criteria as specified in Article 3. This criterion may prove relevant in the context of contested states and territories, as it requires that a candidate state be not only willing but also able to ensure human rights and the rule of law for everyone within its jurisdiction.
Against this background, Article 3 provides substantive membership criteria, describing the standards a state has to fulfil to become a member. Article 4 provides a capacity membership criterion, describing the control a state has to exercise over its territory to ensure the implementation of human rights and the rule of law. These two aspects of the CoE's membership criteria will be examined by looking at the CoE's admission policy in the past. This will help determine what issues under Articles 3 and 4 could be triggered in Kosovo's quest for CoE membership.
2.1
Human Rights and the Rule of Law The history of accession to the CoE reveals that for a country to meet the membership criteria, the organization demands that it have a rather basic democratic regime while also fulfilling the CoE's agendas on the rule of law and human rights.11 This admission policy emerged, for example, from the accession of Portugal and Spain shortly after the collapse of their respective dictatorial regimes.12 Other admission cases also suggest that a state may join The foregoing does not suggest that a state can join the CoE without fulfilling certain standards on human rights and the rule of law. The CoE has demonstrated that compliance with minimum human rights standards is non-negotiable. On these grounds, the CoE refused to grant membership to Belarus, for example, for its failure to abolish capital punishment.
At the same time, it may be observed that the CoE has followed a policy termed "advance instalment on trust"17 by granting membership to some states that did not, strictly speaking, fulfil some of the membership criteria but promised to work toward realization of the organization's aim in the post-accession phase.
This admission-friendly history is perhaps understandable. By granting membership to new states, the CoE empowers itself to monitor the situation in the area of human rights and the rule of law in those countries. One of the most important features of this monitoring is the ability of the ECtHR to decide on human rights complaints against CoE member states. The CoE can thus cases of admission to the CoE. It only aims to discuss the cases of admission to the CoE that either did not fully comply with the membership requirements or had unresolved territorial or political disputes. Overall, the foregoing suggests that membership in the Council is as much in the interest of potential candidates as it is in the interest of the organization. It is for this reason that membership in the CoE is conditioned on the fulfillment of basic standards concerning human rights and rule of law. Against this background, this article will examine both Kosovo's ability to fulfill basic human rights standards and the Council's initiative to explore different modes of cooperation with Kosovo, including in the context of membership.
2.2
Ability to Exercise Control over Territory: Territorial Disputes When the Council granted membership to Azerbaijan and Moldova in 2001 and 1995, respectively, they were involved in disputes in connection with parts of their territories, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria, respectively.18
With regard to the admission of Azerbaijan and Armenia (the latter became a member in 2001), pace recommended that their "membership would also help to establish a climate of confidence in the region, thus contributing to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict".19
Furthermore, at the time when Russia became a member of the CoE (in 1996), its troops were present in Moldova, a member of the organization. In Opinion 193 concerning Russia's application for membership in the CoE, pace called for "the withdrawal of the [Russian] 14th Army and its equipment from the territory of Moldova within a time-limit of three years",20 a commitment that Russia has not implemented to this day. Moldova chose not to challenge Russia's membership on account of the latter's activities in Transdniestria.
The foregoing suggests that unresolved political disputes involving candidate states have not discouraged the Council from welcoming new members. To the contrary, membership was granted to mitigate such tensions, for instance, when membership was granted to Armenia and Azerbaijan to mitigate tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, or to Russia, in an effort to resolve tensions in Moldova.21 This admission history is highly relevant in the context of Kosovo's path to the Council, as it reveals that political relations between Kosovo and Serbia per se may not present an obstacle. To the contrary, the admission process may be used in mitigating such tensions.
Law and Politics in Kosovo's Quest for CoE Membership
Accession to an international organization can be particularly challenging for an applicant state that has unresolved political issues with an existing member. The CoE's admission history reveals that, at the time when new member states were joining the organization, there was only one case where an existing member state had a serious disagreement with an applicant state regarding their statehood or territory. That was the case of Moldova, which had concerns about Russia's involvement in its territory when the latter applied for CoE membership. Moldova did not challenge Russia's admission, hoping that Russia would honor its commitment to withdraw its army from Transdniestria.22 Another example that deserves attention is the admission of Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the time when these states were seeking CoE membership, there was already tension between them with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. It was not possible for either of them to hinder the other's admission, however, since they both joined the organization on the same day.23
The desire of Kosovo's authorities to join the Council comes while Serbia, a member of the organization, still considers Kosovo to be part of its territory. In this regard, Serbia could argue, first, that Kosovo is not a state, and, second, that 21 It has been argued that the CoE has made the "peaceful solution of conflicts" an additional membership requirement. However, Professor Eckart Klein observes that "the Council did not insist on the complete fulfilment of this admission requirement, rather had it incorporated into the commitments which the States since 1993 had to accept upon accession obligating them to resolve conflicts by peaceful means". [j] urisdiction is an aspect of a state's sovereignty, as the right to prescribe and enforce laws is an essential component of statehood".27 The ECtHR has maintained that a state exercises de jure territorial jurisdiction over its territory even when that territory is under de facto 24 It should be noted that Serbia's discourse on Kosovo has oscillated over the years. In July 2017, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic wrote an article on Kosovo in the Serbian newspaper Blic in which he said that it was high time that people "stopped putting their heads in the sand" and "got real" on Kosovo. In a more recent judgment related to Kosovo, the Strasbourg Court once again touched on the issue of the authorities responsible for enforcing laws and securing human rights in Kosovo. In d.l. v. Austria, a case concerning the extradition of a citizen of Serbia from Austria to Kosovo, neither the ECtHR nor the Government of Serbia, as a third-party intervener, considered whether any authority other than Kosovo's institutions, namely unmik or Serbia, exercised any public power and thus had the duty to ensure the human rights of the applicant in Kosovo.39 Furthermore, the Serbian Government went a step further by finding problematic the fact that the Austrian Government had not required diplomatic assurances from Kosovo's authorities with respect to the applicant.40 This suggests that Kosovo's authorities had the capacity to engage in such diplomatic functions.
In conclusion, it transpires from the ECtHR's approach to the situation in Kosovo subsequent to its declaration of independence that the Strasbourg Court did not endorse the continuity of Serbia's de jure jurisdiction. This is further reinforced by the absence in Azemi of an assessment of Serbia's positive obligations in Kosovo. In this light, both Azemi and, more recently, d.l. v. Austria signal that, in the view of the Court, no external authority is assumed to exercise de jure jurisdiction over Kosovo.41
De Facto Control over the Territory At the time of writing, Kosovo's institutions exercise limited control in the northern part of the territory. Certain state prerogatives, including the judiciary and security enforcement, are exercised with the assistance of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (eulex), the nato Kosovo Force See "Agreement on Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovogeneral principles/main elements", 25 August 2015, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/ statements-eeas/docs/150825_02_association-community-of-serb-majority-municipali ties-in-kosovo-general-principles-main-elements_en.pdf>. 47
See "Prosecutors and judges of the non-majority community swear the oath in front of President Thaçi", press release (24 October 2017), available at <http://www.president -ksgov.net/en/news/prosecutors-and-judges-of-the-non-majority-community-swear-the -oath-in-front-of-president-thaci>. certain whether or not Serbia could raise such an issue in the case of Kosovo. Hence, the ability of Kosovo's authorities to exercise their powers throughout the country would certainly minimize the negative impact of any such possible claims in the accession process.
Willingness and Ability to Comply with the Democratic Values of the Rule of Law and Human Rights
Provided that the question of Kosovo's membership were put on the Council's agenda, pace would assign rapporteurs and would conduct fact-finding missions to examine the situation in Kosovo regarding human rights and the rule of law. Based on their findings, it would then tailor a set of membership requirements.49 Ordinarily, these requirements include, but are not limited to, establishing particular mechanisms, adopting laws and treaties, undertaking specific actions, and adopting particular policies.50 pace has already issued reports with respect to Kosovo from which it has emerged that the areas that could require improvement include political interference in the work of the judiciary, the legislature, the media, and other regulatory institutions; corruption; organized crime; and integration of the Roma population.51 In addition, pace appears to have two particular requirements for Kosovo: first, that it cooperate with Serbia and, second, that it establish a specialized judicial organ to try certain crimes committed during and after the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict. Concerning the first question, the eu has acknowledged Kosovo's commitment to cooperate with Serbia in the framework of the so-called Brussels talks.52 Since the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is ongoing, however, pace may require continuation of the dialogue and effective implementation of the agreements reached between the two parties. and on those grounds vote against Kosovo's accession to the Council. At the same time, a Spanish pace member of Catalan ethnicity might not align their position with Spain on Kosovo's statehood, and might favor Kosovo's membership in the Council. In addition, pace members could be divided over the question of Kosovo's membership depending on whether they favor or reject European integration per se. The rise of populism in this regard might not favor Kosovo's prospects for accession to the Council. It follows that support from the foreign ministry of a particular member of the Council might not necessarily mean that all pace members from that country would share in that support.
To conclude, the recognition of Kosovo by more than two-thirds of the Council's member states suggests that Kosovo's political status may not be an obstacle to its accession. Furthermore, it should be noted that some states that have not recognized Kosovo's independence supported Kosovo in its accession bid to join the CoE's Venice Commission and the Development Bank.67 However, the complex procedure for admission to the Council, including the sponsorship procedure to ensure an invitation to join the Council, the vote on that matter requiring the presence and the vote of at least twothirds of Committee members, and the diverse composition of pace members, demonstrate instances where Kosovo might stumble in its membership path to the Council. This article shows that Kosovo is able to fulfill the basic CoE membership criteria and that its contested status by some CoE members may not hamper its ambition to join the organization. In particular, the article suggests that Kosovo exercises de jure jurisdiction over its territory and is committed to observing the Council's key instruments and the Strasbourg Court's case law. pace would devise membership criteria if the Committee were to invite Kosovo to become a member. Such requirements might include general standards concerning human rights and the rule of law, as well as specific standards, including the necessity to cooperate with Serbia and with the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office operating in The Hague.
The recognition of Kosovo's independence by more than two-thirds of Council members is a sign that Kosovo could, in principle, secure the votes necessary to obtain membership. Ten years have passed since Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, and Kosovo's Government has expressed the desire to join the Council. However, the country has not yet sought to initiate a formal procedure for its admission. This raises questions about the possible reasons for this lack of action. One might wonder whether this has been due to passivity on the part of Kosovo diplomacy, the arrangements that could be made under the eumediated Kosovo-Serbia talks, or geopolitics. Regarding diplomatic passivity, such an explanation is not convincing, as the country has made efforts to join other international organizations and institutions, including those affiliated with the CoE, such as the Venice Commission and the Development Bank. The Kosovo-Serbia talks might play a role in this delay. In particular, it could be 
